IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/acb/cbeeco/2011-541.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Matching as a Cure for Underprovision of Voluntary Public Good Supply: Analysis and an Example

Author

Listed:
  • Wolfgang Buchholz

    ()

  • Richard Cornes

    ()

  • Dirk Rübbelke

    ()

Abstract

Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior match-ing equilibrium, however, emerges only under very special conditions. But we show in this note that corner solutions, in which some agents choose zero flat contributions, normally avoid underprovision and illustrate and interpret our results by a simple numerical example.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Buchholz & Richard Cornes & Dirk Rübbelke, 2011. "Matching as a Cure for Underprovision of Voluntary Public Good Supply: Analysis and an Example," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-541, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2011-541
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp541.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen & Tremblay, Jean-Francois, 2007. "Commitment and matching contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1664-1683, September.
    2. Boadway, Robin & Pestieau, Pierre & Wildasin, David, 1989. "Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 157-176, July.
    3. Kirchsteiger, Georg & Puppe, Clemens, 1997. "On the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods through government subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 489-504, December.
    4. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185.
    5. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February.
    6. Guttman, Joel M, 1978. "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 251-255, May.
    7. Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, 2000. "Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(2), pages 169-186, May.
    8. Josef Falkinger & Johann K. Brunner, 1999. "Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(4), pages 357-379.
    9. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Cornes, Richard & Rübbelke, Dirk, 2011. "Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 639-645.
    10. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Cornes, Richard C, 1983. "Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1753-1765, November.
    11. Danziger, Leif & Schnytzer, Adi, 1991. "Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 55-64, April.
    12. Schlesinger, Harris, 1989. "On the Analytics of Pure Public Good Provision," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 44(1), pages 102-109.
    13. Falkinger, Josef, 1996. "Efficient private provision of public goods by rewarding deviations from average," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 413-422, November.
    14. Althammer, Wilhelm & Buchholz, Wolfgang, 1993. "Lindahl-equilibria as the outcome of a non-cooperative game : A reconsideration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 399-405, August.
    15. Thomson, William, 1999. " Economies with Public Goods: An Elementary Geometric Exposition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 139-176.
    16. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2007. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 201-219, April.
    17. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2011-541. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/feanuau.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.