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Political support for tax decentralisation

Listed author(s):
  • PERALTA, Susana

This paper presents a spatial model of a city with two unequally productive jurisdictions. City residents bear a commuting cost to work in either of the two jurisdictions. In each jurisdiction, a fixed public budget must be financed with a wage tax and a head-tax. We compare the first best optimum to tax decentralisation equilibria. From the total welfare viewpoint, tax competition is always inefficient. Inefficiency may be higher under utilitarian governments or majoritarian ones. If local governments are utilitarian, the more productive jurisdiction is better off at the first best than with tax competition, while the other is worst off. If they are majoritarian, both jurisdictions will under some conditions prefer the tax decentralisation to the first best.

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File URL: http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/download/attach/workspace/SpacesStore/390076fc-cd14-4f25-b702-37bb3aae4b09/coredp_2004_24.pdf
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2004024.

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Date of creation: 00 May 2004
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2004024
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