IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey

  • Clemens Fuest
  • Bernd Huber
  • Jack Mintz

This paper surveys the literature on the implications of international capital mobility for national tax policies. Our main issue for consideration in this survey is whether taxation of income, specifically capital income will survive, how border crossing investment is taxed relative to domestic investment and whether welfare gains can be achieved through international tax coordination. We develop a a “working horse model” of multinational investment which allows to derive many of the key results from the literature on international taxation in a unified framework. Moreover, we put special emphasis on the problem of tax competition and financial arbitrage.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2003/wp-cesifo-2003-05/cesifo_wp956.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 956.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_956
Contact details of provider: Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Peter Birch Sørensen, 2001. "International Tax Coordination: Regionalism Versus Globalism," CESifo Working Paper Series 483, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Haufler,Andreas, 2008. "Taxation in a Global Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521047593.
  3. DePeter James A. & Myers Gordon M., 1994. "Strategic Capital Tax Competition: A Pecuniary Externality and a Corrective Device," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 66-78, July.
  4. Weichenrieder, Alfons J, 1996. " Transfer Pricing, Double Taxation, and the Cost of Capital," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 98(3), pages 445-52.
  5. Michael Keen & Hannu Piekkola, 1996. "Simple rules for the optimal taxation of international capital income," IFS Working Papers W96/18, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  6. Michael Keen, 1993. "The welfare economics of tax co-ordination in the European Community : a survey," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 15-36, February.
  7. Huizinga, H. & Nielsen, S.B., 1995. "Capital Income and Profits Taxation with Foreign Ownership of Firms," Papers 9582, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  8. Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1996. "Optimality properties of alternative systems of taxation of foreign capital income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 373-399, June.
  9. Gordon, R.H. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1994. "Why Is Capital So Immobile Internationally?: Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation," Working Papers 358, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  10. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, 1994. "Social Protection and Political Competition," CORE Discussion Papers 1994057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Eggert, Wolfgang & Haufler, Andreas, 1996. "When do small countries win tax wars?," Discussion Papers, Series II 304, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
  12. Ronald B. Davies, 2003. "The OECD Model Tax Treaty: Tax Competition And Two-Way Capital Flows," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 725-753, 05.
  13. Roger H. Gordon & Hal R. Varian, 1986. "Taxation of Asset Income in the Presence of a World Securites Market," NBER Working Papers 1994, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Haufler, Andreas, 1997. " Factor Taxation, Income Distribution and Capital Market Integration," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(3), pages 425-46, September.
  15. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
  16. Wolfgang Eggert & Bernd Genser, 2001. "Is Tax Harmonization Useful?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 511-527, August.
  17. Kehoe, Patrick J, 1989. "Policy Cooperation among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 289-96, April.
  18. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  19. Mintz, J. & Tulkens, H., 1984. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 1984027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. Huber, Bernd, 1999. "Tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 441-458, March.
  21. WILDASIN, David E., . "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," CORE Discussion Papers RP 831, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  22. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
  23. Lisa Grazzini & Tanguy Van Ypersele, 2003. "Fiscal Coordination and Political Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 305-325, 04.
  24. Rosanne Altshuler & T. Scott Newlon & Joel Slemrod, 1993. "The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income Repatriation Patterns of U. S . Multinational Corporations," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in International Taxation, pages 77-116 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000. "Corporate tax systems and cross country profit shifting," Munich Reprints in Economics 20419, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  26. repec:ttp:itpwps:0402 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Kennan, John & Riezman, Raymond, 1988. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(1), pages 81-85, February.
  28. Sinn, Hans-Werner & Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 1997. "Foreign direct investment, political resentment and the privatization process in eastern Europe," Munich Reprints in Economics 19562, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  29. Gordon, Roger H, 1986. "Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1086-1102, December.
  30. Janeba, Eckhard, 1996. "Foreign direct investment under oligopoly: Profit shifting or profit capturing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 423-445, June.
  31. Elitzur, Ramy & Mintz, Jack, 1996. "Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 401-422, June.
  32. Andreas Haufler & Ian Wooton, 2001. "Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment," CESifo Working Paper Series 628, CESifo Group Munich.
  33. Gabrielsen, T.S. & Schjelderup, G., 1999. "Transfer Pricing and Ownership Structure," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 202, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  34. Lee, Kangoh, 1997. "Tax Competition with Imperfectly Mobile Capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 222-242, September.
  35. Dutton, John, 1982. "The Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income: A Comment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 373-80, May.
  36. Huber, Bernd, 1999. "Tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model," Munich Reprints in Economics 19402, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  37. Wolfram Richter & Kerstin Schneider, 2001. "Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 245-262, May.
  38. Gordon, Roger H, 1992. " Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1159-80, July.
  39. Thomas A. Gresik, 2001. "The Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 800-838, September.
  40. Gordon, Roger H, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 567-86, November.
  41. Janeba,Eckhard, 1991. "Corporate income tax competition,Double taxation treaties, and foreign direct investment," Discussion Paper Serie A 361, University of Bonn, Germany.
  42. Andreas Haufler & Ian Wooton, . "Country Size and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment," Working Papers 9702, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  43. Bond, E.W. & Samuelson, L., 1988. "Strategic Behavior And The Rules For International Taxation Of Capital," Papers 3-88-10, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  44. Clemens Fuest & Thomas Hemmelgarn, 2003. "Corporate Tax Policy, Foreign Firm Ownership and Thin Capitalization," CESifo Working Paper Series 1096, CESifo Group Munich.
  45. Konan, Denise Eby, 1997. "Strategic taxation of the multinational enterprise: A new argument for double taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 301-309, January.
  46. Manuel Leite-Monteiro & Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, 2003. "Employment Subsidy with Capital Mobility," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 327-344, 04.
  47. Feldstein, Martin & Hartman, David, 1979. "The Optimal Taxation of Foreign," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 613-29, November.
  48. Jean-François Wen, 1997. "Tax Holidays and the International Capital Market," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 129-148, May.
  49. Leechor, Chad & Mintz, Jack, 1993. "On the taxation of multinational corporate investment when the deferral method is used by the capital exporting country," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 75-96, May.
  50. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November.
  51. Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "To harmonize or to compete? That's not the question," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 335-349, June.
  52. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
  53. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
  54. Konrad, K.A. & Schjelderup, G., 1998. "Fortress Building in Global Tax Competition," Papers 17/98, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  55. Sinn, H.W., 1990. "Taxation And The Birth Of Foreign Subsidiaries," Papers 66, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  56. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  57. Fuest, Clemens, 2000. " The Political Economy of Tax Coordination as a Bargaining Game between Bureaucrats and Politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 357-82, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_956. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.