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To harmonize or to compete? That's not the question

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  • Frey, Bruno S.
  • Eichenberger, Reiner

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  • Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "To harmonize or to compete? That's not the question," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 335-349, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:60:y:1996:i:3:p:335-349
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1990. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 489-504, May.
    2. Pommerehne, Werner W., 1990. "The empirical relevance of comparative institutional analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 458-469, May.
    3. Eichenberger, Reiner, 1994. "The Benefits of Federalism and the Risk of Overcentralization," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 403-420.
    4. Hettich, Walter & Winer, Stanley L, 1988. "Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 701-712, September.
    5. Steunenberg, Bernard, 1992. "Referendum, Initiative, and Veto Power: Budgetary Decision Making in Local Government," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 501-529.
    6. Werner W. Pommerehne & Friedrich Schneider*, 1978. "Fiscal Illusion, Political Institutions, And Local Public Spending," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 381-408, August.
    7. Casella, Alessandra & Frey, Bruno, 1992. "Federalism and clubs : Towards an economic theory of overlapping political jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 639-646, April.
    8. Schneider Friedrich, 1992. "The Federal And Fiscal Structures Of Representative And Direct Democracies As Models For A European Federal Union: Some Ideas Using The Public-Choice Approach," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-36, December.
    9. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, December.
    10. Bernard Steunenberg, 1992. "Referendum, Initiative, and Veto Power: Budgetary Decision Making in Local Government," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 501-529, November.
    11. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    12. Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct Democracy: Politico-economic Lessons from Swiss Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 338-342, May.
    13. Reiner Eichenberger, 1994. "The Benefits of Federalism and the Risk of Overcentralization," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 403-420, August.
    14. John Lott & W. Reed, 1989. "Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 75-96, April.
    15. Richard A. Posner, 1971. "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 22-50, Spring.
    16. Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, 1995. "Competition among Jurisdictions: The Idea of FOCJ," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Lüder Gerken (ed.), Competition among Institutions, chapter 8, pages 209-229, Palgrave Macmillan.
    17. Rexford Santerre, 1986. "Representative versus direct democracy: A Tiebout test of relative performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 55-63, January.
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