Globalisability of Universalisability? How to apply the Generality Principle and Constitutionalism internationally
Our aim is to address some elementary aspects of the innate trade-off between both classical liberal requirements for an adequate order of rules: (a) effectiveness in the sense of the rules' congruence with a given order of (economic) actions and (b) legitimacy in the sense of the rules? congruence with the given social-cultural conditions of (political) consent. In the following part 2, we review Hayek's own account of the requirements of a liberal international order of rules, finding several arguments that help to further illustrate the above-mentioned trade-off. But we will hardly find Hayek relate his legal and political philosophy of "universalisability" to assessments of international governance. Therefore, we have to go back to Hayek's accounts of universalisable rules of just conduct in part 3 in order to prepare our account of such rules' globalisability. In part 4 we address the generality norm as a constitutional principle for the governance structure of an international order. Both general, proscriptive rules and specific, prescriptive regulations of the international order are contrasted in part 5, as we find them today both on the level of WTO and of EU rules and regulations. Part 6 offers a summary conclusion of our empirical and normative-theoretical observations. We cannot endeavour here to discuss all major elements of existing international law or of an ideal global "constitution of liberty". In fact, we will only occasionally be more explicit about material contents of the rules of the game. This is not only because such a task would be beyond the scope of a single paper. It is also because we like to focus our attention on formal principles that should, in our view, inform any (re-) construction of international governance.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Goethestrasse 10, D-79100 Freiburg im Breisgau|
Web page: http://www.walter-eucken-institut.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dennis Mueller, 1999. "On Amending Constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 385-396, November.
- Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
- Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2002.
"Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 87-99, July.
- Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated," IEW - Working Papers 098, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2000. "Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated," CESifo Working Paper Series 322, CESifo Group Munich.
- Vaubel, Roland, 1994. "The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 151-190, October.
- Vaubel Roland, 1992. "The Political Economy Of Centralization And The European Community," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-38, March.
- Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
- Frey, Bruno S & Stutzer, Alois, 2000. "Happiness, Economy and Institutions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 918-938, October.
- Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Happiness, Economy and Institutions," IEW - Working Papers 015, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2000. "Happiness, Economy and Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 246, CESifo Group Munich.
- Feld, Lars P & Savioz, Marcel R, 1997. "Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 507-538.
- Martin, Dolores Tremewan & Wagner, Richard E, 1978. "The Institutional Framework for Municipal Incorporation: An Economic Analysis of Local Agency Formation Commissions in California," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 409-425, October.
- Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct Democracy: Politico-economic Lessons from Swiss Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 338-342, May.
- Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-1053, July.
- Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(4), pages 556-578, October.
- William A. Niskanen, 1992. "The Case for a New Fiscal Constitution," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 13-24, Spring.
- Matsusaka, John G, 1995. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 587-623, June.
- Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct-Democratic Rules: The Role of Discussion," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 341-354.
- Charles Blankart, 2000. "The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 27-39, March.
- Pommerehne, Werner W., 1990. "The empirical relevance of comparative institutional analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 458-469, May.
- Bowler, Shaun & Donovan, Todd, 2002. "Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes about Citizen Influence on Government," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(02), pages 371-390, April.
- Rexford Santerre, 1986. "Representative versus direct democracy: A Tiebout test of relative performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 55-63, January.
- Eichenberger, Reiner, 1994. "The Benefits of Federalism and the Risk of Overcentralization," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 403-420.
- Olson, Mancur, Jr, 1969. "The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 479-487, May.
- Pommerehne, Werner W., 1978. "Institutional approaches to public expenditure : Empirical evidence from Swiss municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 255-280, April.
- Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:01:p:63-76_09 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lars P Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2001. "The political economy of direct legislation: direct democracy and local decision-making," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 329-367, October.
- Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2001. "On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 615, CESifo Group Munich. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:aluord:047. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.