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The Political Economy Of Centralization And The European Community

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  • Vaubel Roland

Abstract

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. 'Popitz's law' of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters' attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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  • Vaubel Roland, 1992. "The Political Economy Of Centralization And The European Community," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 11-48, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:3:y:1992:i:1:p:38:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-1992-0102
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