Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension
This paper analyzes one method governments employ to circumvent the discipline of a competitive system of fiscal federalism — intergovernmental collusion in the form of intergovernmental grants. Grants, it is argued, serve to encourage the expansion of the public sector by concentrating taxing powers in the hands of the central government and by weakening the fiscal discipline imposed on governments forced to self-finance their expenditures. The results reported suggest that intergovernmental grants do encourage growth in the public sector. The results offer further support for the use of monopoly government assumptions in public sector modeling. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Philip J. Grossman, 1987.
"Federalism and the Size of Government,"
School of Economics Working Papers
1987-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
- Nelson, Michael A, 1987. "Searching for Leviathan: Comment and Extension," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 198-204, March.
- Michael Marlow, 1988. "Fiscal decentralization and government size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 259-269, March.
- Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-57, September.
- Logan, Robert R, 1986. "Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1304-18, December.
- Hammes, David L & Wills, Douglas T, 1987. "Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government in Canada," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 707-13, October.
- Michael Nelson, 1986. "An empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the context of the Leviathan model of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 283-294, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:1:p:63-69. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.