Peltzman on regulation and politics
There is no question that self-interest matters, not only in private markets but in the political arena as well (see Goldberg, 1974, 1976, 1977). Peltzman's paper is an extremely clever effort to pose the political problem so that the tools and reasoning from the standard model could be extended to the new area with minimal modification. The approach directs attention to technical questions — e.g., the signs of second derivatives (Peltzman, 1976: 220–221) — of a familiar sort. However, the environment in the new area is so different from the more mundane environments in which the theory normally thrives that a major adaptive effort will be necessary for the theory to survive. If it does survive, it will be in a form that is almost unrecognizable. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982
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