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A key-point comparison & the new challenges for the existent Administrative Burden Models (A.B.M’s)

Author

Listed:
  • Nikos Alabanos

    (PhD candidate, Department of Maritime Studies, University of Piraeus)

  • Sotiris Theodoropoulos

    (Professor,Department of Maritime Studies, University of Piraeus)

Abstract

As administrative burden’s reduction (AB) is of crucial importance in order to ensure competitive conditions for national economies, measurement standardization and objectivity is a key component for the implementation of good regulation principles and administrative cost reduction. International experience designates both the main challenges and the limitations in which existent models are subjected to. Moreover, a thorough comparison among the existent administrative burden models’ (ABM’s) stresses specific gaps mainly on data and sampling measurement methods, while the widespread need for a common comparison benchmark among different countries should be addressed.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikos Alabanos & Sotiris Theodoropoulos, 2016. "A key-point comparison & the new challenges for the existent Administrative Burden Models (A.B.M’s)," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 66(1-2), pages 32-45, January-J.
    • Handle: RePEc:spd:journl:v:66:y:2016:i:1-2:p:32-45
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nikos ALABANOS & Sotiris THEODOROPOULOS, 2017. "Measurement Of The Administrative Burden For The Establishment Of Shipping Companies In Greece," Regional Science Inquiry, Hellenic Association of Regional Scientists, vol. 0(2), pages 85-96, December.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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