Rent Dissipation or Government Predation? The Notes Issuance Activity in Italy 1865-1882
The aim of the paper is to examine the hypothesis of rent dissipation in the case of the Italian banking system during the suspension of gold convertibility. The major bank of the new born state of Italy – the Banca Nazionale nel regno d’Italia – experienced over the period 1866-1881 a decrease in its profitability inconsistent with the suspension of convertibility exclusively granted to its notes until 1874 but consistent with rent-seeking activity. The Banca Nazionale d’Italia was giving up present profit in order to maximize its chance to get the monopoly over money issue. Under these circumstances the rent seeking cost is not represented by the bribes offered to civil servants but by the forgone profit borne by shareholders. The complex relationships between banks and government in order to capture the benefits of seignoriage lead to a rent seeking game with evolving rules. The government changed the rules, and adopted an opportunistic behavior.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Clos Guiot Puyricard - CS 30063, 13089 Aix en Provence Cedex 2|
Phone: 04 42 28 12 08
Fax: +33 (0)4 42 28 08 00
Web page: http://www.univ-cae.org
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ciccarelli Carlo & Fenoaltea Stefano, 2008.
"Construction in Italy's Regions, 1861-1913,"
Rivista di storia economica,
Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 303-340.
- Carlo Ciccarelli & Stefano Fenoaltea, 2008. "Construction in Italy's Regions, 1861-1913," CEIS Research Paper 136, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 03 Dec 2008.
- Ciccarelli, Carlo & Fenoaltea, Stefano, 2008. "Construction in Italy's regions, 1861-1913," MPRA Paper 9714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gordon Tullock, 1984. "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: A comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 95-97, January.
- Sobel, Russell S & Garrett, Thomas A, 2002. "On the Measurement of Rent Seeking and Its Social Opportunity Cost," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 115-136, July.
- Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1999. "The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 439-454, June.
- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 1997. "The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-045/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
- Giuseppina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2001. "Le banche di emissione in Italia tra il 1861 e il 1893: un caso di concorrenza?," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 91(1), pages 15-74, January.
- Selgin, George, 2001. "In-Concert Overexpansion and the Precautionary Demand for Bank Reserves," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(2), pages 294-300, May.
- Ciccarelli, Carlo & Fenoaltea, Stefano, 2007. "Business fluctuations in Italy, 1861-1913: The new evidence," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 432-451, July.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 9368, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1039, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution of the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2 : Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Discussion Paper 1993-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Mixon, Franklin G, Jr & Laband, David N & Ekelund, Robert B, Jr, 1994. "Rent Seeking and Hidden In-Kind Resource Distortion: Some Empirical Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 1717-1785, February.
- David Laband & John Sophocleus, 1988. "The social cost of rent-seeking: First estimates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 269-275, September.
- Ciccarelli, Carlo & Fenoaltea, Stefano & Proietti, Tommaso, 2008. "The comovements of construction in Italy's regions, 1861-1913," MPRA Paper 8870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
- Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cgm:wpaper:88. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mathieu Bédard)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.