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The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R Is Greater Than 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates


  • Baye, Michael R
  • Kovenock, Dan
  • de Vries, Casper G


In G. Tullock's rent-seeking model, the probability that a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power R. The authors show that a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists when R "is greater than" 2, and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any Nash equilibrium. The authors derive a tight bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous. The authors' results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1994. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R Is Greater Than 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 363-380, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:81:y:1994:i:3-4:p:363-80

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Meirowitz, Adam, 2003. "On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 213-218, February.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:66:y:1972:i:02:p:555-568_13 is not listed on IDEAS
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    5. Jeffrey Banks & John Duggan, 2001. "A Multidimensional Model of Repeated Elections," Wallis Working Papers WP24, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    6. Enriqueta Aragon├ęs & Zvika Neeman, 1994. "Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition," Economics Working Papers 162, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 1996.
    7. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
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    9. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June.
    10. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1999. "Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 155, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    11. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
    12. repec:cup:apsrev:v:64:y:1970:i:02:p:426-448_12 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Fishburn, Peter C., 1972. "Lotteries and social choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 189-207, October.
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