The Question of the Rent Dissipation in the Notes Issuance Activity: The Case of the Italian Banking System before the Creation of the Bank of Italy
The aim of the paper is to study empirically the rent dissipation hypothesis in the case of Italy before the creation of the National Bank of Italy in 1893. The major bank of the state of Italy – the Banca Nazionale Sarda (BNS) – experienced over the period 1866-1893 a decrease in its profitability consistent with rent-seeking activity. The BNS was giving up present profit in order to maximize its chance to get the monopoly over notes issue. The rent seeking cost has been identified as the forgone profit borne by the bank’s shareholders and not the bribes offered to civil servants.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Clos Guiot Puyricard - CS 30063, 13089 Aix en Provence Cedex 2|
Phone: 04 42 28 12 08
Fax: +33 (0)4 42 28 08 00
Web page: http://www.univ-cae.org
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sobel, Russell S & Garrett, Thomas A, 2002. "On the Measurement of Rent Seeking and Its Social Opportunity Cost," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 115-136, July.
- Giuseppina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2001. "Le banche di emissione in Italia tra il 1861 e il 1893: un caso di concorrenza?," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 91(1), pages 15-74, January.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993.
"The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates,"
9368, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1039, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution of the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2 : Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Discussion Paper 1993-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- David Laband & John Sophocleus, 1988. "The social cost of rent-seeking: First estimates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 269-275, September.
- Mixon, Franklin G, Jr & Laband, David N & Ekelund, Robert B, Jr, 1994. "Rent Seeking and Hidden In-Kind Resource Distortion: Some Empirical Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 1717-1785, February.
- Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
- Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
- Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1999.
"The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests,"
Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 439-454, June.
- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 1997. "The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-045/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Selgin, George, 2001. "In-Concert Overexpansion and the Precautionary Demand for Bank Reserves," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(2), pages 294-300, May.
- Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cgm:wpaper:45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mathieu Bédard)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.