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Le banche di emissione in Italia tra il 1861 e il 1893: un caso di concorrenza?

Author

Listed:
  • Giuseppina Gianfreda

    (Centro di Metodologia delle Scienze Sociali, LUISS, «Guido Carli», Roma)

  • Nathalie Janson

    (Centro di Metodologia delle Scienze Sociali, LUISS, «Guido Carli», Roma)

Abstract

During the years between 1861 and 1893 six banks were authorized to issue notes redeemable in gold or silver — though with frequent episodes of suspension — and accepted at par in Italy. Because of the existence of several issuing banks the Italian experience was often referred to as an example of competition in money issuance; as a result, the regime of competition was blamed for the financial crisis which took place at the end of the period. This article challenges the idea that note issuance in Italy was carried out under competition. The theoretical framework used to analyse the Italian experience from the viewpoint of competition is free-banking; the theory provides a model to analyse competition between notes issued by unrestricted banks which are changed at par and redeemable in some standard good on a fractional reserve basis. Although the Italian case cannot be considered an example of freebanking, this framework can help explain whether — and under which circumstances — note issuance conditions in Italy came close to a situation of competition. According to the model, redeemability and the absence of any role by Government are essential conditions for competition between currencies to take place. Judged on these basis, Italian experience has been on the whole a far cry from competition, not only because of the frequent suspensions of redeemability but because Government interventions distorted competitive decision-making by banks and on some occasions prevented the clearing process to take place. In addition to the direct support granted to single banks — in exchange for loans or for political purposes — and to several forms of regulation on the issuing activities, competition was hampered by the willingness of Government to suspend redeemability in time of crises. On several occasions banks were given the opportunity to be exempted from the rules of competition instead of maximizing their profit subject to those constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2001. "Le banche di emissione in Italia tra il 1861 e il 1893: un caso di concorrenza?," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 91(1), pages 15-74, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:91:y:2001:i:1:p:15-74
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Gentier & Giuseppina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2006. "The Question of the Rent Dissipation in the Notes Issuance Activity: The Case of the Italian Banking System before the Creation of the Bank of Italy," CAE Working Papers 45, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
    2. Antoine Gentier & Giusepina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2011. "Rent dissipation or government predation ? The notes issuance activity in Italy 1865-1882," Post-Print hal-00735325, HAL.
    3. Fabrizio Mattesini & Giuseppina Gianfreda, 2012. "The Acceptability of Money with Multiple Notes Issuers:the Case of Italy (1861-1893)," Working Papers LuissLab 12100, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
    4. Vittorio Daniele & Pasquale Foresti & Oreste Napolitano, 2017. "The stability of money demand in the long-run: Italy 1861–2011," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 11(2), pages 217-244, May.
    5. Chaido Dritsaki & Melina Dritsaki, 2020. "The Long-run Money Demand Function: Empirical Evidence from Italy," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 10(1), pages 186-195.
    6. Antoine Gentier & Nathalie Janson, 2007. "La politique financière de l'Etat italien et l'évolution du système financier," CAE Working Papers 61, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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