Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.003
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- Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," ECON - Working Papers 186, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2017.
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More about this item
Keywords
Contests; Increasing returns; Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; Robustness of the all-pay auction; Payoff equivalence; Revenue equivalence;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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