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Asymmetric contests with general technologies

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  • Richard Cornes

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  • Roger Hartley

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Abstract

We investigate the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discriminating contests, focussing on existence, uniqueness and rent dissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a production function with decreasing returns for each contestant, there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium. If marginal product is also bounded, limiting total expenditure is equal to the value of the prize in large contests even if contestants differ. Partial dissipation occurs only when infinite marginal products are permitted. Our analysis relies heavily on the use of ‘share functions’ and we discuss their theory and application. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:923-946 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0566-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contests; Rent-seeking; Noncooperative games; Share functions; Share correspondences.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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