IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kee/kerpuk/2002-22.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Cornes

    (School of Economics, University of Nottingham,)

  • Roger Hartley

    () (Keele University Department of Economics)

Abstract

We investigate the Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discriminating contests, focusing on existence, uniqueness and rent dissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a production function with decreasing returns for each contestant, equilibria are unique. If marginal product is also bounded,limiting total expenditure is equal to the value of the prize in large contests even if contestants differ. Partial dissipation can occur only when infinite marginal products are permitted. Our analysis relies heavily on the use of ‘share functions’ and we discuss their theory and application. Increasing returns typically introduces multiple equilibria and requires an extension of share functions to correspondences. We describe the appropriate theory and apply it to the characterisation of all equilibria of contests employing the asymmetric generalisation of a widely-used symmetric contest success function.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  • Handle: RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2002/22
    Note: Much of the research in this paper was undertaken while the first author was a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Economic Studies, University of Munich. The support of the Center is gratefully acknowledged. The work of the first author was supported by a Leverhulme Research Fellowship. We would like to thank Wolfgang Buchholz, Juergen Eichberger, Gauthier Lanot, Todd Sandler, Henry Tulkens and members of seminars at the University of Melbourne and the Australian National University for helpful and encouraging comments on earlier drafts.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/wpapers/kerp0222.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contests; rentseeking; noncooperative games; share functions; share correspondences.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2002/22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martin E. Diedrich) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Martin E. Diedrich to update the entry or send us the correct email address. General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dekeeuk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.