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Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles

Author

Listed:
  • Qiang Fu
  • Jingfeng Lu
  • Yue Pan

Abstract

We consider a multi-battle team contest in which players from two rival teams form pairwise matches to fight in distinct component battles, which are carried out sequentially or (partially) simultaneously. A team wins if and only if its players win a majority of battles. Each player benefits from his team's win, while he can also receive a private reward for winning his own battle. We find that the outcomes of past battles do not distort the outcomes of future battles. Neither the total expected effort nor the overall outcome of the contest depends on the contest's temporal structure or its feedback policy. (JEL C72, D72, D74, D82)

Suggested Citation

  • Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Yue Pan, 2015. "Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2120-2140, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:7:p:2120-40
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20121469
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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