Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
We characterize pure-strategy Nash equilibria for symmetric rent-seeking contests in which the contest success function is homogeneous of degree zero. The equilibrium strategies have a simple form. We give sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (04)
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