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Permit markets with political and market distortions

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This article investigates the cost effectiveness of cap-and-trade markets in the presence of both political and market distortions. We create a model where dominant firms have the ability to rent seek for a share of pollution permits as well as influence the market equilibrium with their choice of permit exchange because of market power. We derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium and show the interaction of these two distortions has consequences for the resulting allocative efficiency of the market. We find that if the dominant rent-seeking firms are all permit buyers (or a composition of buyers and sellers) then allocative efficiency is improved relative to the case without rent seeking; by contrast, if the dominant rent-seeking firms are all permit sellers then allocative efficiency reduces.

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  • Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2020. "Permit markets with political and market distortions," Discussion Papers Series 615, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  • Handle: RePEc:qld:uq2004:615
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    1. D’Amato, Alessio & Valentini, Edilio & Zoli, Mariangela, 2017. "Tradable quota taxation and market power," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 248-252.
    2. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 281-301, May.
    3. Dickson, Alex & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2018. "Strategic trade in pollution permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 94-113.
    4. Ellerman,A. Denny & Buchner,Barbara K. & Carraro,Carlo (ed.), 2007. "Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875684, June.
    5. Dickson, Alex & MacKenzie, Ian A. & Sekeris, Petros G., 2018. "Rent-seeking incentives in share contests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 53-62.
    6. Francisco Álvarez & Francisco André, 2015. "Auctioning Versus Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 873-906, December.
    7. Beat Hintermann, 2011. "Market Power, Permit Allocation and Efficiency in Emission Permit Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 49(3), pages 327-349, July.
    8. Yu-Bong Lai, 2008. "Auctions or grandfathering: the political economy of tradable emission permits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 181-200, July.
    9. David Malueg & Andrew Yates, 2006. "Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 719-727, April.
    10. MacKenzie, Ian A. & Ohndorf, Markus, 2012. "Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 51-65.
    11. Yu-Bong Lai, 2007. "The Optimal Distribution of Pollution Rights in the Presence of Political Distortions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(3), pages 367-388, March.
    12. Beat Hintermann, 2017. "Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(1), pages 89-112, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pollution market; Market power; rent seeking.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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