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The Gains from Agricultural Groundwater Trade and the Potential for Market Power: Theory and Application

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  • Ellen M. Bruno
  • Richard J. Sexton

Abstract

This article models and estimates the efficiency gains from using market‐based instruments relative to command and control to manage groundwater. A theoretical model of an imperfectly competitive groundwater market is developed to show how the magnitude and distribution of the gains from trade change as market structure varies. Market structure is a key consideration because future groundwater markets will likely feature geographic limitations to trade, large agricultural players, and a legal environment that is conducive to forming cartel‐like coalitions. Application of the model to a groundwater‐dependent agricultural region in southern California shows the existence of large gains from trade, despite the potential for market power, with benefits up to 36% greater than that under command and control. Distributional impacts, however, can be sizable even for small degrees of market power. Simulations that vary market conditions show that results likely generalize to other groundwater basins.

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  • Ellen M. Bruno & Richard J. Sexton, 2020. "The Gains from Agricultural Groundwater Trade and the Potential for Market Power: Theory and Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(3), pages 884-910, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:ajagec:v:102:y:2020:i:3:p:884-910
    DOI: 10.1002/ajae.12031
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    2. Françeska Tomori & Erik Ansink & Harold Houba & Nick Hagerty & Charles Bos, 2021. "Market power in California's water market," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-011/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Zuo, Alec & Wheeler, Sarah Ann & Xu, Ying, 2022. "Expanders, diversifiers or downsizers? Identifying clusters of irrigators’ water trade and farm management strategies in Australia," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 264(C).
    4. Wang, Xu & Zhu, Lei & Liu, Pengfei, 2021. "Manipulation via endowments: Quantifying the influence of market power on the emission trading scheme," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    5. Thiago Morello, 2023. "An Agri-environmental Scheme for Reducing Inputs Subjected to Accidental Spillage: An Application to Agricultural Burnings by Smallholders," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 84(2), pages 383-408, February.
    6. Athanasios Tsiarapas & Zisis Mallios, 2023. "Estimating the long-term impact of market power on the welfare gains from groundwater markets," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 25(3), pages 377-406, July.
    7. Sarah Ann Wheeler & Alec Zuo & John Kandulu, 2021. "What Water are We Really Pumping? The Nature and Extent of Surface and Groundwater Substitutability in Australia and Implications for Water Management Policies," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(4), pages 1550-1570, December.
    8. Tomori, Françeska & Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold & Hagerty, Nick & Bos, Charles, 2021. "Market power in California’s water market," Working Papers 2072/534854, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    9. Bruno, Ellen M. & Jessoe, Katrina, 2021. "Missing markets: Evidence on agricultural groundwater demand from volumetric pricing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    10. Jingjing Wang & Xiaoyang Wang, 2023. "Why is water illiquid?: The NQH2O water index futures," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(1), pages 602-621, March.
    11. Sahil Bhatia & S. P. Singh, 2023. "Can an Incentivized Command-and-Control Approach Improve Groundwater Management? An Analysis of Indian Punjab," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(22), pages 1-27, November.
    12. de Bonviller, Simon & Wheeler, Sarah Ann & Zuo, Alec, 2020. "The dynamics of groundwater markets: Price leadership and groundwater demand elasticity in the Murrumbidgee, Australia," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    13. Charles A. Taylor, 2022. "Irrigation and Climate Change: Long-Run Adaptation and Its Externalities," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Perspectives on Water Resources, Climate Change, and Agricultural Sustainability, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Ellen M. Bruno & Nick Hagerty & Arthur R. Wardle, 2022. "The Political Economy of Groundwater Management: Descriptive Evidence from California," NBER Chapters, in: American Agriculture, Water Resources, and Climate Change, pages 343-365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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