The Effects of Imperfect Competition on the Size and Distribution of Research Benefits
Studies of agricultural research benefits usually assume perfectly competitive markets. Studies that have allowed for market power of agribusiness firms have generally assumed unrealistic pure monopsony or monopoly behavior. This paper allows for processing firms to exhibit a range of degrees of oligopsony power in buying raw farm products and oligopoly power in selling processed farm products. The results indicate that different types of research-induced technical change can exacerbate or ameliorate distortions from the exercise of market power by agribusiness firms, which affects the size and especially the distribution of research benefits. Copyright 1997, Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 79 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202|
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:79:y:1997:i:4:p:1252-1265. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.