Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
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More about this item
KeywordsContests; All-pay; Auctions; Asymmetries; Interdependent valuations; Correlated signals;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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