Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Heterogeneous
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Siegel, Ron, 2014. "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 684-702.
- Julio González-Díaz & Ron Siegel, 2013. "Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 835-844, November.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2016. "The Distribution of Talent across Contests Feedback in Higher Education," Working Papers 789, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Matthias Dahm, 2017. "All-Pay Auctions with Extra Prize: A Partial Exclusion Principle," Discussion Papers 2017-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
More about this item
Keywordsall-pay; contest; asymmetric; heterogeneous;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-07-23 (Microeconomics)
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