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The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information

Author

Listed:
  • Baye, M.R.
  • Kovenock, D.
  • De Vries, C.

Abstract

In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:8-92-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Holz, V.J. & Kilburn, M.R., 1991. "The Demand for Child Care and Child Care Costs: Should We Ignore Families with Non-Working Mothers?," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 91-11, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
    2. Evelyn Lehrer & Seiichi Kawasaki, 1985. "Child care arrangements and fertility: An analysis of two-earner households," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 22(4), pages 499-513, November.
    3. Arleen Leibowitz & Linda Waite & Christina Witsberger, 1988. "Child care for preschoolers: Differences by child’s age," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 25(2), pages 205-220, May.
    4. Blau, David M & Robins, Philip K, 1988. "Child-Care Costs and Family Labor Supply," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(3), pages 374-381, August.
    5. V. Joseph Hotz & M. Rebecca Kilburn, "undated". "The Demand for Child Care and Child Care Costs: Should We Ignore Families with Non-Working Mothers? 1992," University of Chicago - Population Research Center 91-11, Chicago - Population Research Center.
    6. Sandra L. Hofferth & Douglas A. Wissoker, 1992. "Price, Quality, and Income in Child Care Choice," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 27(1), pages 70-111.
    7. Arleen Leibowitz & Jacob Alex Klerman & Linda J. Waite, 1992. "Employment of New Mothers and Child Care Choice: Differences by Children's Age," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 27(1), pages 112-133.
    8. Lehrer, Evelyn L, 1989. "Preschoolers with Working Mothers: An Analysis of the Determinants of Child Care Arrangements," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 1(4), pages 251-268.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory ; economic models;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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