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Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions

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  • Aniol Llorente-Saguer

    (Queen Mary University of London)

  • Roman M. Sheremeta

    (Case Western Reserve University and Chapman University)

  • Nora Szech

    (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, WZB, and CESifo Institute)

Abstract

A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favouring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favourable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid-caps significantly diminishes the discouragement effect. Bid-caps can also improve revenue. Most deviations from Nash equilibrium can be explained by the level-k model of reasoning.

Suggested Citation

  • Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Roman M. Sheremeta & Nora Szech, 2016. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers 796, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:796
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    Cited by:

    1. Blake A. Allison & Jason J. Lepore & Aric P. Shafran, 2021. "Prize Scarcity And Overdissipation In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 361-374, January.
    2. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016. "The pros and cons of workplace tournaments," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 302-302, October.
    3. Dietmar Fehr & Julia Schmid, 2018. "Exclusion in all‐pay auctions: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 326-339, June.
    4. Deck, Cary & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2019. "The tug-of-war in the laboratory," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    5. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017. "Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 407-425, October.
    6. Cason, Timothy N. & Masters, William A. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2020. "Winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: Theory and experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 314-327.
    7. Roman Sheremeta, 2018. "Experimental Research on Contests," Working Papers 18-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    8. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Koh, Youngwoo & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Constrained contests with a continuum of battles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 992-1011.
    9. Enzo Brox & Daniel Goller, 2024. "Tournaments, Contestant Heterogeneity and Performance," Papers 2401.05210, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    10. Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2021. "Incentives and motivation in dynamic contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 194-216.
    11. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024. "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 63-90.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    All-pay auction; Rent-seeking; Bid-caps; Tie-breaks; Contest design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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