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Mixed-strategy play in single-stage first-price all-pay auctions with symmetric players

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  • Rapoport, Amnon
  • Amaldoss, Wilfred

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(03)00140-9
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 54 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 585-607

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:54:y:2004:i:4:p:585-607
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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  1. Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Discussion Paper 1990-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May.
  3. Shogren, Jason F & Baik, Kyung H, 1991. "Reexamining Efficient Rent-Seeking in Laboratory Markets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 69-79, February.
  4. Davis, Douglas D & Reilly, Robert J, 1998. "Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 89-115, April.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
  6. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
  7. Rapoport, Amnon & Amaldoss, Wilfred, 2000. "Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 483-521, August.
  8. Potters, Jan & de Vries, Casper G. & van Winden, Frans, 1998. "An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 783-800, November.
  9. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
  10. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1998. "Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 828-853, August.
  11. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  12. Leininger, Wolfgang, 1991. "Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 146-172, February.
  13. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. "Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
  14. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
  15. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March.
  16. Dwight Lee, 1985. "Marginal lobbying cost and the optimal amount of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 207-213, January.
  17. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
  18. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June.
  19. Erwin Amann & Wolfgang Leininger, 1995. "Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 273-279, October.
  20. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
  22. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. "The Design of Rent-Seeking Competitions: Committees, Preliminary and Final Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 63-76, April.
  23. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  24. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  25. Barut, Yasar & Kovenock, Dan, 1998. "The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 627-644, November.
  26. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. "Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
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Cited by:

  1. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymyr, 2006. "Caps on bidding in all-pay auctions: Comments on the experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 276-283, October.
  2. Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Roman M. Sheremeta & Nora Szech, 2016. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5955, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2011. "On The Complete Information First-Price Auction And Its Intuitive Solution," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(03), pages 353-361.
  4. Wilfred Amaldoss & Chuan He, 2009. "Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: A Strategic Analysis," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 472-487, 05-06.
  5. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Cadsby, C. Bram & Song, Yang, 2007. "Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 213-239, May.
  6. Ofer Azar & Michael Bar-Eli, 2011. "Do soccer players play the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(25), pages 3591-3601.
  7. Andreas Oestreich, 2015. "Firms’ Emissions and Self-Reporting Under Competitive Audit Mechanisms," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 949-978, December.
  8. Chuan He & Yuxin Chen, 2006. "Research Note—Managing e-Marketplace: A Strategic Analysis of Nonprice Advertising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(2), pages 175-187, 03-04.
  9. Bruttel, Lisa & Friehe, Tim, 2015. "A note on making humans randomize," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 40-45.
  10. Emara, Noha & Owens, David & Smith, John & Wilmer, Lisa, 2014. "Minimax on the gridiron: Serial correlation and its effects on outcomes in the National Football League," MPRA Paper 58907, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Duffy, Sean & Naddeo, JJ & Owens, David & Smith, John, 2016. "Cognitive load and mixed strategies: On brains and minimax," MPRA Paper 71878, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Emara, Noha & Owens, David & Smith, John & Wilmer, Lisa, 2014. "Serial correlation in National Football League play calling and its effects on outcomes," MPRA Paper 67862, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Wilfred Amaldoss & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Collaborative Product and Market Development: Theoretical Implications and Experimental Evidence," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 396-414, February.
  14. Wilfred Amaldoss & James R. Bettman & John W. Payne, 2008. "—Biased but Efficient: An Investigation of Coordination Facilitated by Asymmetric Dominance," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(5), pages 903-921, 09-10.

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