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Sequential Two-Prize Contests

  • Aner Sela

    ()

    (Department of Economics,Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)

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    We study two-stage all-pay auctions with two identical prizes. In each stage, players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the equilibrium strategies where players’ marginal values for the prizes are either declining or inclining

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    File URL: http://www.ec.bgu.ac.il/monaster/admin/papers/0803.pdf
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    Paper provided by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0803.

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    Length: 17 pages
    Date of creation: 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0803
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    Web page: http://www.bgu.ac.il/econ

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    1. Barut, Yasar & Kovenock, Dan, 1998. "The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 627-644, November.
    2. Gavious, Arieh & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2000. "Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-19, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    3. Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Kaplan, T.R. & Luski, I. & Wettstein, D., 2000. "Innovative Activity and Sunk Cost," Discussion Papers 0006, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    5. Chen Cohen & Todd R. Kaplan & Aner Sela, 2008. "Optimal rewards in contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 434-451.
    6. Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Konrad, Kai A., 2006. "Silent interests and all-pay auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 701-713, July.
    8. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA.
    9. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
    10. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
    11. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2002. "Contest Architecture," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    12. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
    13. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March.
    14. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2008. "Allocation of prizes in asymmetric all-pay auctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 123-132, March.
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