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Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions

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  • Chen Cohen

    () (BGU)

  • Aner Sela

    () (BGU)

Abstract

We study asymmetric all-pay auctions with multiple objects where players?values for the objects are common knowledge. The players have different values for the objects but they have the same ranking. The contest designer may award one prize including all the objects to the player with the highest bid, or, alternatively, he may allocate several prizes, each prize including one object such that the fi?rst prize is awarded to the player with the highest bid, the second prize to the player with the second- highest bid, and so on until all the objects are allocated. We analyze the distribution of effort in one-prize and multiple-prize contests and show that allocation of several prizes may be optimal for a contest designer who maximizes the total effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen Cohen & Aner Sela, 2005. "Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers 0503, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0503
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    File URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/0503.pdf
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    1. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    2. Barut, Yasar & Kovenock, Dan, 1998. "The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 627-644, November.
    3. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
    4. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
    5. Szymanski, Stefan & Valletti, Tommaso, 2004. "First and Second Prizes in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 4484, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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