IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Common-Value All-Pay Auctions With Asymmetric Information

  • Ezra Einy

    ()

    (BGU)

  • Ori Haimanko

    ()

    (BGU)

  • Ram Orzach

    ()

    (Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309, USA)

  • Aner Sela

    ()

    (BGU)

Registered author(s):

    We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante asymmetric information represented by finite partitions of the set of possible values of winning. We consider two families of such auctions: in the first, one of the players has an information advantage (henceforth, IA) over his opponent, and in the second, no player has an IA over his opponent. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium in auctions with IA and explicitly characterize it; for auctions without IA we find a sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium in monotonic strategies. We further show that, with or without IA, the ex-ante distribution of equilibrium effort is the same for every player (and hence the players' expected efforts are equal), although their expected payoffs are different. In auctions with IA, the players have the same ex-ante probability of winning, which is not the case in auctions without IA.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Working/1306.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1306.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 31 pages
    Date of creation: 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1306
    Contact details of provider: Postal: P.O.B 653, Beer-Sheva 8410501
    Phone: +972-8-647-2268
    Fax: +972-8-647-2941
    Web page: http://www.bgu.ac.il/econ

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March.
    2. Wärneryd, Karl, 2000. "Information in Conflicts," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 388, Stockholm School of Economics.
    3. Orzach, Ram & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7891, Paris Dauphine University.
    4. Benny Modovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2008. "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," Working Papers 0802, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    5. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    6. Gavious, Arieh & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2000. "Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-19, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    7. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA.
    8. Malueg, David A. & Orzach, Ram, 2009. "Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 177-180, November.
    9. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
    10. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
    11. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    12. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2002. "Contest Architecture," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    13. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
    14. Ron Siegel, 2009. "All-Pay Contests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 71-92, 01.
    15. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    16. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
    17. Karl Wärneryd, 2012. "Multi-player contests with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 277-287, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1306. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Aamer Abu-Qarn)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.