Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We showthat the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Additionally, it is shown that bidder's information advantage over others is rewarded in sophisticated equilibria.
|Date of creation:||00 Feb 2001|
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