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Auction theory adaptations for real life applications

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  • Kashyap, Ravi

Abstract

We develop extensions to auction theory results that are useful in real life scenarios.

Suggested Citation

  • Kashyap, Ravi, 2018. "Auction theory adaptations for real life applications," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(4), pages 452-481.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:72:y:2018:i:4:p:452-481
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2018.09.001
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    5. Levin, Dan & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2004. "Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 229-251, October.
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    7. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October.
    8. Kandel, Shmuel & Sarig, Oded & Wohl, Avi, 1999. "The Demand for Stocks: An Analysis of IPO Auctions," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 227-247.
    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-980, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auction; First price sealed bid; Strategy; Valuation; Uncertainty; Log-normal;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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