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Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Author

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  • Paul Klemperer

    (Nuffield College, Oxford University)

Abstract

This paper, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Surveys, provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), 1999.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, correlation and affiliation, asymmetries, entry costs and the number of bidders, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, payments for quality, budget constraints, externalities, testing the theory, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple numerical examples, and a bibliography for each section.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Microeconomics 9903002, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9903002 Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on PC; to print on HP/PostScript/; pages: 95 ; figures: included in paper. We never published this piece and now we would like to reduce our mailing and xerox cost by posting it.
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Bidding; Auction Theory; Common-value Auctions; Private-value Auctions; Mechanism Design;

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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