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Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution

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  • Ranaldo, Angelo
  • Rossi, Enzo

Abstract

The Swiss Treasury has used the sealed-bid, uniform-price auction format for allocating government bonds since 1980. In this study, we examine the authorities’ motivation for choosing the uniform-price auction. In addition, we describe how the institutional set-up evolved over time. It includes bidding requirements, class of bidders, pre-auction information, the bidding process, the determination of the cut-off price and the release of post-auction information. Finally, we provide the details of each of the 356 auctions that were held until and including 2014.

Suggested Citation

  • Ranaldo, Angelo & Rossi, Enzo, 2016. "Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution," Working Papers on Finance 1609, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:usg:sfwpfi:2016:09
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    Cited by:

    1. Basil Guggenheim & Mario Meichle & Thomas Nellen, 2019. "Confederation debt management since 1970," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 155(1), pages 1-23, December.
    2. Andreas Hefti & Peiyao Shen & Regina Betz, 2019. "Market power and information effects in a multi-unit auction," ECON - Working Papers 320, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government Bonds; Treasury Auctions; Uniform-price Auction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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