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Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric


  • Olivier Armantier


  • Erwann Sbai


The structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetry across bidders, as well as supply uncertainty are estimated with a sample of French Treasury auctions. We find evidence of both informational and risk aversion asymmetries between bidders. A counter-factual analysis also suggests that, in the context of the French Treasury auctions, a shift from the discriminatory to the uniform-price format would simultaneously benefit the French Treasury and the auction's participants.

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  • Olivier Armantier & Erwann Sbai, 2003. "Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric," Department of Economics Working Papers 03-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:03-02

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    Cited by:

    1. Monostori, Zoltán, 2013. "Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók
      [Discriminatory and uniform-price auctions]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1048-1074.
    2. Enenajor, Emanuella & Sebastian, Alex & Witmer, Jonathan, 2012. "An assessment of the Bank of Canada's term PRA facility," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 123-143.
    3. Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2016. "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 11731, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Sara G. Castellanos & Marco A. Oviedo, 2004. "Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Results from a Structural Econometrics Approach," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000118, David K. Levine.
    5. repec:eee:indorg:v:53:y:2017:i:c:p:215-239 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Francisco Alvarez & Cristina Mazón, 2016. "Price volatility in the secondary market and bidders’ heterogeneous behavior in Spanish Treasury auctions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 1435-1466, June.
    7. Laura Veldkamp & David Lucca & Nina Boyarchenko, 2015. "Intermediaries as Information Aggregators," 2015 Meeting Papers 236, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Walter Orellana Rocha & Bernardo X. Fernández Tellería & Vladimir Fernández Quiroga, 2006. "Subasta electrónica interactiva y subasta a sobre cerrado: Un análisis comparativo de los resultados en Bolivia," Revista de Análisis del BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia, vol. 9(1), pages 65-113, December.
    9. Laura Veldkamp & David Lucca & Nina Boyarchenko, 2017. "Taking Orders and Taking Notes: Dealer Information Sharing in Treasury Markets," 2017 Meeting Papers 808, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Jakub Kastl & Ali Hortacsu, 2007. "Testing for Common Valuation in Treasury Bills Auctions," 2007 Meeting Papers 222, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Boyarchenko, Nina & Lucca, David O. & Veldkamp, Laura, 2015. "Taking orders and taking notes: dealer information sharing in financial markets," Staff Reports 726, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, revised 01 Mar 2016.
    12. Daniel Marszalec, 2016. "The Impact of Auction Choice on Revenue in Treasury Bill Auctions - An Empirical Evaluation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1020, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    13. Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2016. "Uniform-price auctions for Swiss government bonds: Origin and evolution," Economic Studies 2016-10, Swiss National Bank.
    14. Timothy P. Hubbard & Harry J. Paarsch, 2012. "On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in Auction Models with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 291, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    15. Olivier Armantier & Jean-Pierre Florens & Jean-Francois Richard, 2008. "Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 965-981.
    16. Rodolfo Guerrero & José Luis Negrín, 2006. "Eficiencia del sistema bancario mexicano 1997-2004: una estimación dinámica," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 235-259, julio-sep.
    17. Ali Hortacsu & Jakub Kastl, 2008. "Testing for Common Values in Canadian Treasury Bill Auctions," Discussion Papers 07-053, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    18. Paul Castillo & Carlos Montoro & Vicente Tuesta, 2006. "Estimación de la tasa natural de interés para la economía peruana," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 261-298, julio-sep.
    19. Olivier Armantier & Nourredine Lafhel, 2009. "Comparison of Auction Formats in Canadian Government Auctions," Staff Working Papers 09-5, Bank of Canada.
    20. Hortaçsu, Ali, 2011. "Recent progress in the empirical analysis of multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 345-349, May.

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