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Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor

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  • Raphaële Préget

Abstract

[fre] Raphaële Préget Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor. L'objectif de cet article est de faire le point sur le système d'enchère des valeurs du Trésor. Bien que largement employée dans de nombreux pays, la technique de l'adjudication pour le placement des nouvelles émissions de titres publics suscite diverses interrogations. Il existe notamment un débat persistant qui oppose les deux procédures les plus couramment utilisées dans le monde : l'enchère discriminatoire et l'enchère à prix uniforme. Ce débat motive de nombreux travaux théoriques, empiriques et expérimentaux. Cet article s'inscrit à la suite de celui de Florence Naegelen [1995] dont le but était de « mettre en évidence de façon simple les arguments qui plaident en faveur d'un prix uniforme ». L'objectif, ici, consiste à pré- senter certains développements récents qui remettent en cause la supériorité de l'enchère à prix uniforme sur l'enchère discriminatoire, pour la France en particulier. L'élément privilégié dans cette revue de la littérature repose sur la prise en compte de l'aspect pluri-unitaire des demandes dans les enchères du Trésor. [eng] Treasury Securities Auctions. The objective of this article is to focus on the Treasury securities auction system. Although widely used in many countries, the auctioning technique to sell new issued government securities raises many questions. There exists in particular a persistent debate opposing the two procedures most used in the world : the discriminatory auction and the uniform-price auction. This debate motivates numerous theoretical, empirical and experimental studies. This survey follows the article of Florence Naegelen [1995] which aim was to « bring to light in a simple way the arguments which plead in favor of a uniform price ». The objective here is to present some recent developments which challenge the superiority of the uniform price auction on the discriminatory auction for France in particular. The privileged element of this review of the literature relies on the multi-unit aspect of the demands in Treasury auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaële Préget, 2004. "Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 63-110.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2004_num_18_4_1536
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2004.1536
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Heller & Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "The auctions of Swiss government bonds: should the Treasury price discriminate or not?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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    7. Simon, David P, 1994. "The Treasury's Experiment with Single-Price Auctions in the Mid-1970s: Winner's or Taxpayer's Curse?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(4), pages 754-760, November.
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