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Multi-Unit Auctions: A Survey of Theoretical Literature

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  • Cumpston, Anne
  • Khezr, Peyman

Abstract

This article aims to provide a comprehensive survey of the theoretical research on multi-unit auctions to help identify the gap in this literature. Multi-unit auctions have been extensively used in practise and account for significant amount of transactions in some real-world markets. However, the theoretical research on these auctions has attract less attention compared to single unit auctions. The focus of this article is on those research that study multi-unit auctions for the sale of multiple units of homogeneous objects to potential buyers with more than one unit demand. The articles are categorized based on the assumptions of their models regarding bidders' values and the type of auction. Further the gap in this literature is identified with those areas that require further theoretical research.

Suggested Citation

  • Cumpston, Anne & Khezr, Peyman, 2020. "Multi-Unit Auctions: A Survey of Theoretical Literature," MPRA Paper 101336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:101336
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; multi-unit; uniform; discriminatory.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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