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Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool

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  • McAdams, David

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  • McAdams, David, 2007. "Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 48-53, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:1:p:48-53
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
    2. Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
    3. Damianov, Damian S., 2005. "Erratum to "The uniform price auction with endogenous supply" [Econ. Lett. 88 (2005) 152-158]," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 133-133, October.
    4. LiCalzi, Marco & Pavan, Alessandro, 2005. "Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 227-250, January.
    5. Matti Keloharju & Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist, 2005. "Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1865-1902, August.
    6. Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June.
    7. Yvan Lengwiler, 1999. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(2), pages 373-392.
    8. Ilan Kremer & Kjell G. Nyborg, 2004. "Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 147-159, Spring.
    9. Damianov, Damian S., 2005. "The uniform price auction with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 152-158, August.
    10. Ilan Kremer, 2004. "Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 849-877.
    11. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F., 2001. "Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 29-34, October.
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