IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Declining Valuations And Equilibrium Bidding In Central Bank Refinancing Operations

Listed author(s):
  • Christian Ewerhart

    (University of Zurich)

  • Nuno Cassola

    (European Central Bank)

  • Natacha Valla

    (Banque de France)

Among the most puzzling observations for the euro money market are the bid shading in the weekly refinancing operations and the development of interest rate spreads. To explain these observations, we consider a standard divisible-good auction à la Klemperer and Meyer (1989) with uniform or discriminatory pricing, and place it in the context of a secondary market for interbank credit. The analysis links the observations for the euro area to the endogenous choice of collateral in credit transactions. We also discuss the Eurosystem’s apparent preference for the discriminatory pricing rule.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011122
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Swiss Finance Institute in its series Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series with number 07-22.

as
in new window

Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp0722
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.SwissFinanceInstitute.ch

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window

  1. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F., 2001. "Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 29-34, October.
  2. Noussair, Charles, 1995. "Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 337-351, March.
  3. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 1995. "Existence of equilibrium in a discriminatory price auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 285-292, December.
  4. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
  5. Cassola, Nuno & Ewerhart, Christian & Morana, Claudio, 2007. "Structural econometric approach to bidding in the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem," Working Paper Series 0793, European Central Bank.
  6. Xavier Freixas & Cornelia Holthausen, 2001. "Interbank market integration under asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers 579, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  7. David McAdams, 2003. "Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1191-1214, 07.
  8. Linzert, Tobias & Nautz, Dieter & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2007. "Bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the European Central Bank: Evidence from a panel sample selection model," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1521-1543, May.
  9. Giuseppe Bruno & Ernesto Maurizio Ordine & Antonio Scalia, 2005. "Banks� participation in the Eurosystem auctions and money market integration," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 562, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  10. Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1999. "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 509-528.
  11. Albert S. Kyle, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 317-355.
  12. Christian Ewerhart & Nuno Cassola & Steen Ejerskov & Natacha Valla, 2007. "Manipulation in Money Markets," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 113-148, March.
  13. Duffie, Darrell, 1996. " Special Repo Rates," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 493-526, June.
  14. Biais, Bruno & Martimort, David & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Competing Mechanisms in a Commun Value Environment," IDEI Working Papers 75, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  15. Ilan Kremer & Kjell G. Nyborg, 2004. "Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 147-159, Spring.
  16. Marco LiCalz & Alessandro Pavan, 2002. "Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions," Discussion Papers 1495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  17. Ayuso, J. & Repullo, R., 2000. "A Model of the Open Market Operations of the European Central Bank," Papers 0011, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  18. Breitung, Jorg & Nautz, Dieter, 2001. "The empirical performance of the ECB's repo auctions: evidence from aggregated and individual bidding data," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 839-856, November.
  19. Cassola, Nuno & Morana, Claudio, 2008. "Modelling short-term interest rate spreads in the euro money market," Working Paper Series 0982, European Central Bank.
  20. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
  21. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Kahn, Charles M., 1998. "Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 25-42, April.
  22. Yvan Lengwiler, 1999. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(2), pages 373-392.
  23. Linzert, Tobias & Nautz, Dieter & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2004. "The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB," Working Paper Series 0359, European Central Bank.
  24. Bartzsch, Nikolaus & Craig, Ben R. & Fecht, Falko, 2005. "The eurosystem money market auctions: a banking perspective," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2005,10, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  25. Stracca, Livio & Ejerskov, Steen & Martin Moss, Clara, 2003. "How does the ECB allot liquidity in its weekly main refinancing operations? A look at the empirical evidence," Working Paper Series 0244, European Central Bank.
  26. Hartmann, Philipp & Manna, Michele & Manzanares, Andrés, 2001. "The microstructure of the euro money market," Working Paper Series 0080, European Central Bank.
  27. Sushil Bikhchandani & Chi-fu Huang, 1993. "The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 117-134, Summer.
  28. Baltensperger, Ernst, 1974. "The Precautionary Demand for Reserves," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(1), pages 205-210, March.
  29. Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
  30. Robert G. Hansen, 1988. "Auctions with Endogenous Quantity," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 44-58, Spring.
  31. Kjell G. Nyborg & Ulrich Bindseil & Ilya A. Strebulaev, 2005. "Bidding and Performance in Repo Auctions: Evidence from ECB Open Market Operations," Working Papers 2005.92, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  32. Fecht, Falko & Nyborg, Kjell G & Rocholl, Jörg, 2010. "The Price of Liquidity: Bank Characteristics and Market Conditions," CEPR Discussion Papers 7794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  33. Simon, David P., 1994. "Markups, quantity risk, and bidding strategies at treasury coupon auctions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 43-62, February.
  34. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-764.
  35. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2005. "Equilibrium and inefficiency in fixed rate tenders," Working Paper Series 0554, European Central Bank.
  36. Hassler, Uwe & Nautz, Dieter, 2008. "On the persistence of the Eonia spread," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 184-187, December.
  37. McAdams, David, 2007. "Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 48-53, April.
  38. Ulrike Neyer & Jürgen Wiemers, 2004. "The Influence of a Heterogeneous Banking Sector on the Interbank Market Rate in the Euro Area," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 140(III), pages 395-428, September.
  39. Viswanathan, S. & Wang, James J. D., 2002. "Market architecture: limit-order books versus dealership markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 127-167, April.
  40. William Poole, 1968. "Commercial Bank Reserve Management In A Stochastic Model: Implications For Monetary Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 23(5), pages 769-791, December.
  41. Yawitz, Jess B., 1977. "An Analytical Model of Interest Rate Differentials and Different Default Recoveries," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(03), pages 481-490, September.
  42. Nautz, D., 1995. "Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 301-306, June.
  43. Christian Ewerhart & Nuno Cassola & Steen Ejerskov & Natacha Valla, "undated". "Optimal Allotment Policy in Central Bank Open Market Operations," IEW - Working Papers 201, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  44. Draaisma, Teun & Noussair, Charles, 1997. "Optimal bidding in a uniform price auction with multi-unit demand1," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 157-162, October.
  45. Nautz, Dieter, 1997. "How Auctions Reveal Information: A Case Study on German REPO Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(1), pages 17-25, February.
  46. Goldreich, David, 2007. "Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(02), pages 443-466, June.
  47. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
  48. Ilan Kremer, 2004. "Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 849-877.
  49. Swinkels, Jeroen M, 2001. "Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 37-68, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp0722. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marilyn Barja)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.