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Structural Econometric Approach to Bidding in the Main refinancing Operations of the Eurosystem

Author

Listed:
  • Nuno Cassola

    ()

  • Christian Ewerhart

    ()

  • Claudio Morana

    ()

Abstract

This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank repo auctions. It is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the primitives of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading components) are directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we calibrate a theoretical model in order to illustrate some comparative static results. This exercise sheds light on the debate about the reversed winner's curse found in the empirical literature on ECB auctions by showing that it may be related to an identification problem. Overall the results suggest that strategic and optimal behavior is prevalent in ECB tenders. We find evidence of a statistically significant bid-shading component, even though the number of bidders is very large. Bid-shading increases with liquidity uncertainty and decreases with the number of participants and with price uncertainty. We argue that a sufficient condition for the latter effect to appear in the data is that the residual supply facing an individual bidder does not change much ex-post when very short-term market rates increase.

Suggested Citation

  • Nuno Cassola & Christian Ewerhart & Claudio Morana, 2006. "Structural Econometric Approach to Bidding in the Main refinancing Operations of the Eurosystem," ICER Working Papers 26-2006, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:icr:wpicer:26-2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Strebulaev, Ilya A. & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2002. "Bidding and performance in repo auctions: evidence from ECB open market operations," Working Paper Series 0157, European Central Bank.
    2. Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 675-689.
    3. Philip A. Haile & Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1445, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Pagan,Adrian & Ullah,Aman, 1999. "Nonparametric Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521355643, December.
    5. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2010. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 30-43.
    6. Julio Carrillo & Patrick Fève & Julien Matheron, 2007. "Monetary Policy Inertia or Persistent Shocks: A DSGE Analysis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(2), pages 1-38, June.
    7. Athey, Susan & Haile, Philip A., 2007. "Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions," Handbook of Econometrics,in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 60 Elsevier.
    8. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
    9. Viswanathan, S. & Wang, James J. D., 2002. "Market architecture: limit-order books versus dealership markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 127-167, April.
    10. Albert S. Kyle, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 317-355.
    11. Matt Shum & Phil Haile & Han Hong, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Auctions," Economics Working Paper Archive 501, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    12. Giuseppe Bruno & Ernesto Maurizio Ordine & Antonio Scalia, 2005. "Banks� participation in the Eurosystem auctions and money market integration," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 562, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    13. Matthew Shum, 2000. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1598, Econometric Society.
    14. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 733-764.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2010. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 30-43.
    2. Julio Carrillo & Patrick Fève & Julien Matheron, 2007. "Monetary Policy Inertia or Persistent Shocks: A DSGE Analysis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(2), pages 1-38, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    repo auctions; monetary policy implementation; primary money market market; multi unit auctions; discriminatory auctions; collateral; central bank; nonparametric estimation;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General

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