Recent progress in the empirical analysis of multi-unit auctions
I discuss some recent progress in the empirical analysis of multi-unit auctions, through which a number of important commodities (Treasury bills and bonds, electricity, emission permits, monetary infusions by some central banks) are allocated.
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- Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
- Ali Hortacsu & Jakub Kastl, 2010. "Informational Advantage and Information Structure: An Analysis of Canadian Treasury Auctions," Discussion Papers 09-031, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
- Philip A. Haile & Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2003.
"Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1445, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Philip A. Haile & Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2004. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Working Papers 2004.149, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Philip A. Haile & Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," NBER Working Papers 10105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Erwann SbaÏ & Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 745-779.
- Olivier Armantier & Erwann Sbai, 2003. "Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric," Department of Economics Working Papers 03-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
- Harry J. Paarsch & Han Hong, 2006. "An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262162350, July.
- David Lucking-Reiley & John A. List, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 961-972, September.
- John List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00520, The Field Experiments Website.
- McAdams, David, 2008. "Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-85, September.
- Athey, Susan & Haile, Philip A., 2007. "Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions," Handbook of Econometrics,in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 60 Elsevier.
- Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2002. "Identification of Standard Auction Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2107-2140, November.
- Athey,S. & Haile,P.A., 2000. "Identification of standard auction models," Working papers 13, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Philippe Février & Raphaële Preget & Michael Visser, 2002. "Econometrics of Share Auctions," Working Papers 2002-09, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Ali Hortaçsu & Steven L. Puller, 2008. "Understanding strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 86-114.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Vuong, Quang, 1996. "Structural Analysis of Auction Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 414-420, May.
- Albert S. Kyle, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 317-355.
- Matt Shum & Phil Haile & Han Hong, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Auctions," Economics Working Paper Archive 501, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:04 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kastl, Jakub, 2012. "On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 339-352.
- repec:feb:framed:0052 is not listed on IDEAS
- John List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Demand reduction in a multi-unit auction: Evidence from a sportscard field experiment," Framed Field Experiments 00180, The Field Experiments Website. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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