Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions
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- Jorge Balat & Juan E. Carranza & Juan D. Martin, 2015.
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- Jorge Balat & Juan E. Carranza & Juan D. Martin, 2015. "Dynamic and Strategic Behavior in Hydropower-Dominated Electricity Markets: Empirical Evidence for Colombia," Borradores de Economia 886, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
- Kastl, Jakub, 2012. "On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 339-352.
- Perez, Alex & Garcia-Rendon, John J., 2021. "Integration of non-conventional renewable energy and spot price of electricity: A counterfactual analysis for Colombia," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 146-161.
- Francisco Alvarez & Francisco J. André, 2013.
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- Alvarez, Francisco & André, Francisco J., 2013. "Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 162381, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Alvarez, Francisco & André, Francisco J., 2015. "Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting," MPRA Paper 61698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- John J. García Rendón & Alex F. Pérez-Libreros, 2019. "El precio spot de la electricidad y la inclusión de energía renovable no convencional: evidencia para Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo CIEF 017393, Universidad EAFIT.
- Ollikka, Kimmo & Tukiainen, Janne, 2013. "Central bank liquidity auction mechanism design and the interbank market," Research Discussion Papers 21/2013, Bank of Finland.
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Keywords
Multi-unit auctions First-order conditions Truth-telling Identification Monotonic best-reply;Statistics
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