If Winning Isn't Everything, Why Do They Keep Score? A Structural Empirical Analysis of Dutch Flower Auctions
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- Gerard J. van den Berg & Bas van der Klaauw, 2007. "If Winning isn't Everything, why do they keep Score? A Structural Empirical Analysis of Dutch Flower Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-041/3, Tinbergen Institute.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- An, Yonghong & Hu, Yingyao & Shum, Matthew, 2010.
"Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: A misclassification approach,"
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- Yingyao Hu & Matthew Shum, 2007. "Estimating First-Price Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders: A Misclassification Approach," Economics Working Paper Archive 541, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywordsdata augmentation; first-price auction; Gibbs sampling; Markov Chain Monte Carlo; observing losing bids; private value; reserve price; speed of reaction;
- C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
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