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Econometrics of first-price auctions with entry and binding reservation prices

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  • Tong Li

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  • Tong Li, 2005. "Econometrics of first-price auctions with entry and binding reservation prices," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 173-200, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:econom:v:126:y:2005:i:1:p:173-200
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    1. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
    2. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
    3. Hansen, Lars Peter, 1982. "Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1054, July.
    4. Elodie Guerre & I. Perrigne & Q.H. Vuong, 2000. "Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions [[Estimation nonparamétrique optimale des enchères au premier prix]]," Post-Print hal-02697497, HAL.
    5. Paarsch, Harry J., 1997. "Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 333-357, June.
    6. Li, Tong & Perrigne, Isabelle & Vuong, Quang, 2000. "Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 129-161, September.
    7. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 343-347.
    8. Vuong, Quang H, 1989. "Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 307-333, March.
    9. R. Preston McAfee & Daniel C. Quan & Daniel R. Vincent, 2002. "How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 391-416, December.
    10. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2002. "Identification of Standard Auction Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2107-2140, November.
    11. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    12. Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. "The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-355, Summer.
    13. K. Newey, Whitney, 1985. "Generalized method of moments specification testing," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 229-256, September.
    14. Donald, Stephen G. & Paarsch, Harry J., 1996. "Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 517-567, August.
    15. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    16. Dan Levin & James L. Smith, 2002. "Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(3), pages 321-350.
    17. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-980, July.
    18. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Timber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 189-200, February.
    19. Li, Tong & Vuong, Quang, 1997. "Using all bids in parametric estimation of first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 321-325, September.
    20. Kenneth Hendricks & Joris Pinkse & Robert H. Porter, 2003. "Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(1), pages 115-145.
    21. Haile,P.A., 1999. "Auctions with resale," Working papers 33, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    22. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    23. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    24. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2002. "Structural Estimation of the Affliated Private Value Auction Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 171-193, Summer.
    25. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
    26. Flinn, C. & Heckman, J., 1982. "New methods for analyzing structural models of labor force dynamics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 115-168, January.
    27. Matthew Shum, 2000. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1598, Econometric Society.
    28. Pagan, Adrian & Vella, Frank, 1989. "Diagnostic Tests for Models Based on Individual Data: A Survey," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages 29-59, Supplemen.
    29. Donald, Stephen G & Paarsch, Harry J, 1993. "Piecewise Pseudo-maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 121-148, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2013. "What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 176(1), pages 46-58.
    2. Fang, Hanming & Tang, Xun, 2014. "Inference of bidders’ risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 180(2), pages 198-216.
    3. Susan Athey & Dominic Coey & Jonathan Levin, 2013. "Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 1-27, February.
    4. Tong Li & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2009. "Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1397-1429.
    5. Li, Tong & Zheng, Xiaoyong, 2012. "Information acquisition and/or bid preparation: A structural analysis of entry and bidding in timber sale auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 29-46.
    6. Hanming Fang & Xun Tang, 2013. "Inference of Bidders’ Risk Attitudes in Ascending Auctions with Endogenous Entry," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-056, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Castaño-Martínez, A. & Pigueiras, G. & Sordo, M.A., 2019. "On a family of risk measures based on largest claims," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 92-97.
    8. Elena Krasnokutskaya & Katja Seim, 2011. "Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2653-2686, October.
    9. Jun, Sung Jae & Pinkse, Joris & Wan, Yuanyuan, 2010. "A consistent nonparametric test of affiliation in auction models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 159(1), pages 46-54, November.
    10. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011. "Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
    11. Li, Tong, 2009. "Simulation based selection of competing structural econometric models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 114-123, February.
    12. Bierens, Herman J. & Song, Hosin, 2012. "Semi-nonparametric estimation of independently and identically repeated first-price auctions via an integrated simulated moments method," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 108-119.
    13. Benjamin V. Rosa, 2019. "Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 161-208, June.
    14. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
    15. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu & Li Zhao, 2015. "Auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders: theory and evidence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 524-545, September.
    17. Brendstrup, Bjarne & Paarsch, Harry J., 2007. "Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 84-108, November.
    18. Hubbard, Timothy P. & Li, Tong & Paarsch, Harry J., 2012. "Semiparametric estimation in models of first-price, sealed-bid auctions with affiliation," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 4-16.
    19. Zheng, Xiaoyong, 2009. "Quantifying the cost of excess market thickness in timber sale auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 553-566, September.
    20. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
    21. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19224 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Emmanuel Guerre & Yao Luo, 2019. "Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auction with Unobserved Competition: A Density Discontinuity Framework," Papers 1908.05476, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    23. An, Yonghong & Hu, Yingyao & Shum, Matthew, 2010. "Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: A misclassification approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 157(2), pages 328-341, August.
    24. Sağlam, Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Working Paper Series 19224, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.

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