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Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature

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  • SaÄŸlam, YiÄŸit

Abstract

Auction models have proved to be attractive to structural econometricians who, since the late 1980s, have made substantial progress in identifying and estimating these rich game-theoretic models of bidder behavior. We provide a guide to the literature in which we contrast the various informational structures (paradigms) commonly assumed by researchers and uncover the evolution of the eld. We highlight major contributions within each paradigm and benchmark modi cations and extensions to these core models. Lastly, we discuss special topics that have received substantial attention among auction researchers in recent years, including auctions formultiple objects, auctions with risk averse bidders, testing between common and private value paradigms, unobserved auction-speci c heterogeneity, and accounting for an unobserved number of bidders as well as endogenous entry.

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  • SaÄŸlam, YiÄŸit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Working Paper Series 4115, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  • Handle: RePEc:vuw:vuwcsr:4115
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    File URL: http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/handle/10063/4115
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    Cited by:

    1. Donna, Javier & Espin-Sanchez, Jose, 2014. "Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions," MPRA Paper 55079, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Aaron Bodoh-Creed & Jörn Boehnke & Brent R. Hickman, 2013. "Optimal Design of Two-Sided Market Platforms: An Empirical Case Study of eBay," Working Papers 13-22, NET Institute.
    3. NAKABAYASHI Jun & HIROSE Yohsuke, 2016. "Structural Estimation of the Scoring Auction Model," Discussion papers 16008, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    4. Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2014. "The Bidder Exclusion Effect," NBER Working Papers 20523, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Hubbard, Timothy P. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2013. "Efficacy of a Bidder Training Program: Lessons from LINC," MPRA Paper 51329, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard, 2015. "Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders," Working Papers 1502, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    7. Ma, Jun & Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2016. "Inference for First-Price Auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator," Microeconomics.ca working papers vadim_marmer-2016-4, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Mar 2018.

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