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Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization

  • Reiss, Peter C.

    (Stanford U)

  • Wolak, Frank A.
Registered author(s):

    This chapter explains the logic of structural econometric models and compares them to other types of econometric models. We provide a framework researchers can use to develop and evaluate structural econometric models. This framework pays particular attention to describing different sources of unobservables in structural models. We use our framework to evaluate several literatures in industrial organization economics, including the literatures dealing with market power, product differentiation, auctions, regulation and entry.

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    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1831.pdf
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    Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1831.

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    Date of creation: Dec 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1831
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
    Phone: (650) 723-2146
    Fax: (650)725-6750
    Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
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    7. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December.
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    36. repec:cep:stiecm:/2000/400 is not listed on IDEAS
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