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Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations

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  • Michael H. Riordan

Abstract

This article analyzes oligopoly interaction in an environment where firms are imperfectly informed about the evolution of the market demand curve. The analysis develops a two-period Cournot framework under the assumptions that demand shifts are positively serially correlated, that firms never directly observe the demand curve, and that firms never observe the previous quantity decisions of rivals. Firms do draw inferences about the position of the demand curve from past observations on prices. Consequently, the current output of a firm will influence the current market price, which will then influence rivals' inferences about future demand. The future output decisions of rivals will respond accordingly. The theory predicts negative dynamic conjectural variations. Essentially, a firm perceives that an increase in its output will lower the current market-clearing price, which will cause rival firms to think that the demand curve has shifted down and hence induce them to lower their outputs in the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael H. Riordan, 1985. "Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 41-50, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:spring:p:41-50
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    Cited by:

    1. Lynn Hunnicutt & David Aadland, 2002. "Market Power with Dynamic Inventory Constraints: The Bias in Standard Measures," Industrial Organization 0211024, EconWPA.
    2. Mehmet Ozbilgin & Mark Penno, 2005. "Corporate Disclosure and Operational Strategy: Financial vs. Operational Success," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(6), pages 920-931, June.
    3. Deodhar, Satish Y. & Sheldon, Ian M., 1996. "Estimation Of Imperfect Competition In Food Marketing: A Dynamic Analysis Of The German Banana Market," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 27(3), October.
    4. Hamilton Emmons & Stephen M. Gilbert, 1998. "Note. The Role of Returns Policies in Pricing and Inventory Decisions for Catalogue Goods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(2), pages 276-283, February.
    5. Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco, 2009. "Misinformative advertising," IESE Research Papers D/809, IESE Business School.
    6. Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 2001. "Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(9), pages 1305-1344, September.
    7. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J. & Santugini, Marc, 2012. "Information in Cournot: Signaling with incomplete control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 361-370.
    8. Engelbert Dockner, 2010. "Equilibrium two-part cost structures," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 18(4), pages 525-537, December.
    9. Fishman, Arthur & Rob, Rafael, 1998. "Experimentation and Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 299-320.
    10. Amparo Urbano & María Dolores Alepuz Domenech, 1991. "Duopoly Experimentation: Cournot And Bertrand Competition," Working Papers. Serie AD 1991-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    11. Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady, 1998. "Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly," Game Theory and Information 9810001, EconWPA, revised 20 Aug 1999.
    12. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, November.
    13. Karp, Larry & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1988. "Dynamic Oligopoly: Estimation and Tests of Market Structure," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7fk1119n, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    14. Vassilis A. Hajivassiliou, 1990. "Testing Game Theoretic Models of Price-Fixing Behaviour," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 935, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    15. Chrysanthos Dellarocas, 2006. "Strategic Manipulation of Internet Opinion Forums: Implications for Consumers and Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(10), pages 1577-1593, October.
    16. Fujimoto, Hiroaki & Park, Eun-Soo, 1997. "Optimal export subsidy when demand is uncertain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 383-390, September.
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    20. Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav & Kalashnykova, Nataliya & Rojas, Ramón Luévanos & Muí±os, Mario Méndez & Uranga, César & Rojas, Arnulfo Luévanos, 2008. "Numerical experimentation with a human migration model," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 189(1), pages 208-229, August.
    21. Barrachina, Alex & Tauman, Yair & Urbano, Amparo, 2014. "Entry and espionage with noisy signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 127-146.
    22. Kim, Jeong-Yoo, 2006. "Hyperbolic discounting and the repeated self-control problem," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 344-359, June.
    23. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Ting Liu & Tao Wang, 2016. "Information Acquisition, Signaling and Learning in Duopoly," Department of Economics Working Papers 16-07, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
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