Characterization of Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit
This paper provides first order conditions for a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions. Under mild conditions we characterize bidding-behavior and generalize previous standard results in the literature. As an application we obtain sufficient conditions for truth-telling, monotonic best reply strategies and identification results for multi-unit auctions.
|Date of creation:||09 Nov 2007|
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- Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
- Araujo, Aloisio & de Castro, Luciano I., 2009.
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