Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting
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More about this item
KeywordsCap-and-trade systems; auctions; grandfathering; market power; Bayesian games of incomplete information.;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
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