Scarcity Rents and Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emissions Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition
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More about this item
KeywordsEmissions permits; Collusion; Market power; Duopoly; Stackelberg model.;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2015-02-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2015-02-16 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2015-02-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2015-02-16 (Regulation)
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