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Emission permit trading between imperfectly competitive product markets

Author

Listed:
  • Guy Meunier

    (ALISS - Alimentation et sciences sociales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

The present paper analyzes the efficiency of emission permit trading between two imperfectly competitive product markets. Even if firms are price takers in permit markets, the integration of permit markets can decrease welfare because of imperfect competition in product markets. If there is asymmetric information between the regulator and firms, the integration of the permit markets could have a positive effect related to the flexibility of an integrated market; this flexibility can justify integrating the permit markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Guy Meunier, 2011. "Emission permit trading between imperfectly competitive product markets," Post-Print hal-02646970, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02646970
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-011-9475-9
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Guy Meunier, 2015. "Prices vs. quantities in presence of a second, unpriced, externality," Working Papers hal-01242040, HAL.
    2. Jiang, Minxing & Zhu, Bangzhu & Wei, Yi-Ming & Chevallier, Julien & He, Kaijian, 2018. "An intertemporal carbon emissions trading system with cap adjustment and path control," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 152-161.
    3. André, Francisco J. & de Castro, Luis M., "undated". "Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emission Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 197636, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    4. Jay S. Coggins & Andrew L. Goodkind & Jason Nguyen & Zhiyu Wang, 2019. "Price Effects, Inefficient Environmental Policy, and Windfall Profits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(3), pages 637-656, March.
    5. Fabio Antoniou & Efthymia Kyriakopoulou, 2019. "On the Strategic Effect of International Permits Trading on Local Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(3), pages 1299-1329, November.
    6. Fabio Antoniou & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Nikos Tsakiris, 2021. "Strategic Export Motives and Linking Emission Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 8847, CESifo.
    7. Tapio Palokangas, 2019. "Emission permit trading with a self-interested regulator," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 21(3), pages 413-426, July.
    8. Mei Wang & Peng Zhou, 2020. "Impact of Permit Allocation on Cap-and-trade System Performance under Market Power," The Energy Journal, , vol. 41(6), pages 215-232, November.
    9. André, Francisco J. & de Castro, Luis Miguel, 2015. "Scarcity Rents and Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emissions Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition," MPRA Paper 61770, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Antoniou, Fabio & Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia, 2015. "On The Strategic Effect of International Permits Trading on Local Pollution: The Case of Multiple Pollutants," Working Papers in Economics 610, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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